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Abstract There is a prominent line of work in natural language semantics, rooted
in the work of Hamblin, in which the meaning of a sentence is not taken to be a
single proposition, but rather a set of propositions—a set of alternatives. This allows
for a more fine-grained view on meaning, which has led to improved analyses of a
wide range of linguistic phenomena. However, this approach also faces a number of
problems. We focus here on two of these, in our view the most fundamental ones. The
first has to dowith howmeanings are composed, i.e., with the type-theoretic operations
of function application and abstraction; the second has to do with how meanings are
compared, i.e., the notion of entailment. Our aim is to reconcile what we take to be
the essence of Hamblin’s proposal with the more orthodox type-theoretic framework
rooted in the work of Montague in such a way that both the explanatory utility of
the former and the solid formal foundations of the latter are preserved. Our proposal
builds on insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics, and it also contributes to
the further development of this framework by specifying how the inquisitive meaning
of a sentence may be built up compositionally.
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1 Introduction
There is a prominent and fruitful line of work in natural language semantics which
deviates from the standard Montagovian approach (Montague 1970, 1973) in that it
takes the semantic value of an expression to be a set of objects in the expression’s usual
domain of interpretation, rather than a single object. For instance, the semantic value
of a complete sentence is not taken to be a proposition but a set of propositions, the
semantic value of an individual-denoting expression is not taken to be an individual
but a set of individuals, and so on. In this framework, the elements of the semantic
value of an expression are called alternatives, and the framework itself is referred to as
alternative semantics. A range of linguistic phenomena have received insightful analy-
ses in alternative semantics, including questions (Hamblin 1973), focus (Rooth 1985),
indeterminate pronouns (Shimoyama 2001;Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002), indefinites
(Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Menéndez-Benito 2005; Aloni 2007), and disjunction
(Simons 2005; Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Aloni 2007).1 While this wealth of applications
shows that alternatives are a useful tool in the semantic analysis of natural language,
the move from the orthodox type-theoretic framework to an alternative-based one also
raises some fundamental issues. In this paper, we will be concerned with two of these
issues, in our opinion the most basic ones. The first issue, which we will refer to as
the compositionality issue, has to do with the fact that in alternative semantics, mean-
ings can no longer be composed by means of the standard type-theoretic operations
of function application and abstraction. The second, which we will refer to as the
entailment issue, has to do with the fact that meanings in alternative semantics can
no longer be compared by means of the standard type-theoretic notion of entailment.
Both problems concern very fundamental features of the semantic framework, and
moreover, as we shall see, neither of them has a straightforward solution.
We will examine why these problems arise. Our diagnosis will be that it is not the
presence of alternatives per se that is to be held responsible, but rather some specific
features of the architecture of alternative semantics. For two such features we will
argue that they are not essential for the utility of the framework, and we will show how
making different architectural choices results in a framework in which the observed
problems do not arise.
While the general aim of this paper is to reconcile alternative-based semantic
theories developed in the Hamblin tradition with the more orthodox type-theoretic
framework rooted in Montague’s work, it also contributes to a more recent and more
specific line of work, namely that of developing the framework of inquisitive seman-
tics (Ciardelli et al. 2013, 2015, among others). Namely, while previous work on
inquisitive semantics has laid out a formal notion of sentence meaning that is more
fine-grained than the standard truth-conditional notion—comprising both informative
1 Wewill concentrate here on the role of alternatives at the level of ordinary semantic values, not at the level




















Fig. 1 Overview of the paper
and inquisitive content—it has not been specified in much detail how the meaning of a
sentence, construed in this more fine-grained way, is to be composed from the mean-
ings of the words that it consists of. This open issue is addressed here; the framework
that we will end up with is a fully compositional inquisitive semantics.
We will arrive at this result in two steps, which are summarized in Fig. 1. Our point
of departure is a Hamblin-style alternative semantics (in the upper left quadrant of the
figure). In the first step, marked as 1 in the diagram, we will give up a certain feature
of alternative semantics, namely the assumption that all expressions denote sets of
objects in their usual domain of interpretation. Rather, we will assume that this is only
the case for sentences. This step will lead us to a framework that we call possibility
semantics, in which one of the issues mentioned above, namely the compositionality
issue, is avoided. This means that, in this framework, meanings can be composed by
means of the standard type-theoretic operations.
In the second step, marked as 2 in the diagram, we will move from possibility
semantics to a compositional inquisitive semantics. This will amount to giving up
another feature of alternative semantics, namely the assumption that the meaning of a
sentence is identical with the set of alternatives it generates. Instead, we will adopt the
weaker assumption that the meaning of a sentence determines the set of alternatives
that it generates, without necessarily being identical to it. This second step solves
the entailment issue: in the resulting framework meanings can again be compared by
means of the standard type-theoretic notion of entailment. Thus, in the compositional
inquisitive semantics that we propose neither of the initial problems arises.
The paper has a straightforward structure: Sect. 2 is concerned with the compo-
sitionality issue (step 1 ), Sect. 3 with the entailment issue (step 2 ), and Sect. 4
concludes.
2 Compositionality
In the standard type-theoretic semantic framework, the semantic value of an expression
α of type τ (notation: α : τ ) relative to an assignment g is an object αg in the
corresponding domain Dτ , where the basic types e, t, and s correspond to primitive
domains of individuals, truth-values and possible worlds, respectively, and a derived
type 〈σ, τ 〉 corresponds to the domain D〈σ,τ 〉 = { f | f : Dσ → Dτ } of functions from
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objects of type σ to objects of type τ . This setup allows us to compose meanings
through the basic type-theoretic operations of function application and abstraction:
(1) Function Application: if α : 〈σ, τ 〉 and β :σ then α(β)g = αg(βg) ∈ Dτ
(2) Abstraction: if α : τ and x : σ then λx.αg is the function mapping
any x ∈Dσ to αg[x →x]
In the meta-language we will use λx .αg[x →x] as a shorthand description of
this function.2
By contrast, in alternative semantics the semantic value αg of an expression α : τ
is no longer a single object in Dτ , but rather a set of such objects: αg ⊆ Dτ .3
As a consequence, meanings can no longer be composed by means of the standard
type-theoretic operations. Let us see why.
2.1 Composition in alternative semantics
2.1.1 Function application
First consider the operation of function application. Suppose α is an expression of
type 〈σ, τ 〉 and β an expression of type σ . In alternative semantics, we have that
αg ⊆ D〈σ,τ 〉 and βg ⊆ Dσ . Now suppose we want to compute the meaning of
α(β). We can no longer obtain α(β)g by simply applying αg to βg , because
αg is not a single function from Dσ to Dτ , but a set of such functions. Thus, the
type-theoretic rule of function application cannot be used to compute α(β)g .
Instead, αg is now a set of functions from objects of type σ to objects of type τ .
Since βg is a set of objects of type σ , what we can naturally do is apply each function
f ∈ αg to each object d ∈ βg . The set of all objects f (d) obtained in this way
is a subset of Dτ , and thus a suitable semantic value for α(β). This operation, known
as pointwise function application, is indeed taken to be the fundamental composition
rule in alternative semantics.
(3) Pointwise function application: if α : 〈σ, τ 〉 and β : σ
then α(β) : τ and α(β)g = { f (d) | f ∈ αg and d ∈ βg}
However, this rule has an important drawback. In computing themeaning of a complex
expression α(β) using pointwise function application, the functor α only has access
2 Our general typographic convention is to use boldface for expressions in the object language (‘logical
form’), and the standard font for meta-language descriptions of semantic objects.
3 In some work on alternative semantics, the types that are assigned to expressions are systematically
adapted: expressions that are usually taken to be of type τ are now rather taken to be of type 〈τ, t〉 (see, e.g.,
Shan 2004; Novel and Romero 2010). The usual correspondence between the type of an expression and its
semantic value is then preserved. In other work, the usual types are preserved: expressions that are usually
taken to be of type τ are still taken to be of type τ (see, e.g., Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle
2006). In this case, the correspondence between the type of an expression and its semantic value changes:
the semantic value of an expression of type τ is no longer a single object in Dτ , but rather a set of such
objects. The choice between these two options seems immaterial; for concreteness we assume the second,
but our arguments do not hinge on this assumption.
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to each alternative for β in isolation; it does not have access to the whole set at once.
This is problematic because, in fact, many functors in natural language do need access
to the whole set of alternatives introduced by their argument at once. Take for instance
negation. The standard treatment of sentential negation in alternative semantics is as
follows (see, e,g., Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002):











βg , not clearly needs access to all the alternatives for β at once. This
result is impossible to obtain by associating negation with a set of objects notg ∈
D〈st,st〉 and letting them combine with the alternatives for β by pointwise function
application. Thus, negation needs to be treated syncategorematically, that is, by means
of a tailor-made rule in the grammar.
This problem is not confined to a few exceptional cases: in fact, the class of operators
that need access to the whole set of alternatives for their argument includes virtually
all operators that are interesting from an alternative semantics perspective: modals
(e.g., Simons 2005; Aloni 2007), conditionals (e.g., Alonso-Ovalle 2006, uncondition-
als (Rawlins 2008), exclusive strengthening operators (e.g., Menéndez-Benito 2005;
Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Roelofsen and van Gool 2010), existential and universal closure
operators (e.g., Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002), and question-embedding verbs. Adopt-
ing pointwise function application as our fundamental composition rule implies that
none of these operators can be given a meaning of their own. Instead, they all have to
be treated by means of tailor-made, syncategorematic composition rules. Clearly, this
is undesirable: we would like our grammar to contain only a few, general composition
rules, and we would like the contribution of a specific linguistic item to be derivable
from its lexical meaning, based on these general rules.
2.1.2 Abstraction
Now let us consider abstraction. Suppose α : τ contains a variable x :σ , and suppose
we want to abstract over x to obtain an expression λx.α of type 〈σ, τ 〉. This is an
operation that is often used in semantics, typically (though not exclusively) in order to
deal with quantification. What semantic value should we assign to λx.α? We cannot
apply the standard abstraction rule, which would identify λx.αg with the function
mapping every x ∈ Dσ to αg[x →x], for that would be a function from Dσ to subsets
of Dτ . What we need for λx.αg is a different object, namely, a set of functions from
Dσ to Dτ , since we want that λx.αg ⊆ D〈σ,τ 〉. Thus, standard abstraction cannot
be applied in alternative semantics.
What ismore, there does not seem to be a straightforwardway of defining a different
abstraction rule for alternative semantics that would yield correct results. A natural
candidate for such a rule was suggested by Hagstrom (1998) and later adopted by
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002). Shan (2004), however, pointed out that this proposal,
combined with the standard techniques for quantification and binding, leads to wrong
empirical predictions. He furthermore argued that it is impossible to obtain the right
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set of functions in a principled way, and that an alternative-based notion of meaning
therefore calls for a variable-free approach to meaning composition (Szabolcsi 1987;
Jacobson 1999), which does entirely without abstraction. Novel and Romero (2010)
argue that the cases which Shan deemed problematic could in fact be dealt with by
enriching the underlying type theory with a new basic type for assignments for e-type
variables,4 and making certain assumptions about the meaning of wh-items. Charlow
(2014), however, argues that Novel and Romero’s strategy still encounters problems.
We will not directly enter the debate on this front, in the sense that, unlike Shan,
we will not depart from lambda abstraction and, unlike Novel and Romero, we will
not try to extend classical alternative semantics in a way that allows for an alternative-
friendly abstraction rule. Instead, we will take a more conservative approach, and ask
whether it is at all necessary to depart from the standard, i.e., non-pointwise abstraction
mechanism. Indeed, we will show that it isn’t, provided that the basic architecture of
the framework is adapted in certainways. In the resulting framework, the cases deemed
problematic by Shan and others will turn out to be unproblematic.
2.2 Possibility semantics
In our view, the feature of alternative semantics that is responsible for its empirical
success is the fact that sentences are taken to express sets of propositions, rather than
single propositions. This yields a notion of sentence meaning that is more structured
than the standard, truth-conditional notion, and this extra structure seems to play a key
role in a range of linguistic phenomena.
However, alternative semantics does not just assume that sentences express sets of
propositions: it goes on to assume that every expression denotes a set of objects in its
usual domain of interpretation. As we have seen, this stronger assumption forces us
to depart from the standard composition rules.
There does not seem to be any particular conceptual motivation for the assumption
that every expression denotes a set of objects. Moreover, in linguistic applications of
the framework the assumption does not seem essential, as we will show in a moment
for some concrete cases. Most importantly, if we discharge this stronger assumption,
then it becomes apparent that the remaining, more fundamental assumption, i.e., that
sentences express sets of propositions, is perfectly compatible with the standard type-
theoretic operations of meaning composition. We will demonstrate this by laying out
a framework that is based on the following three assumptions:
1. the semantic value of a complete sentence is a set of propositions;
2. the semantic value of an expression of type τ is a single object in Dτ ;
3. the fundamental composition rules are the standard type-theoretic ones.
In this framework, which we will refer to as possibility semantics, it is not the compo-
sitional machinery, but rather the typing of expressions that needs to be adjusted. For
instance, consider a complete sentence α. By assumption (1), its semantic value αg
should be a set of propositions. Moreover, by assumption (2), αg has to be an object
4 Novel and Romero attribute this strategy to Poesio (1996); a very similar approach was taken in Rooth
(1985) to compose focus semantic values.
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in the domain Dτ of the corresponding type. Thus, we must take sentences to be of a
type τ such that the objects in Dτ are sets of propositions: this is the type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉,
which we will abbreviate for convenience as T .5
Assuming standard syntactic structures for sentences, we can then use
assumption (3) to reverse engineer the types that should be assigned to various sorts of
sub-sentential expressions. For instance, the following types suggest themselves for
verbs, sentential operators, and quantifiers.6
• walks : 〈e, T 〉
• likes : 〈e, 〈e, T 〉〉
• not : 〈T, T 〉
• or : 〈T, 〈T, T 〉〉
• nobody : 〈〈e, T 〉, T 〉
• who : 〈〈e, T 〉, T 〉
Thus, the relation between alternative semantics and possibility semantics may be
represented succinctly as follows.
Proposition-set semantics
Basic assumption:
sentences denote sets of propositions
Alternative semantics
Further assumption:
all expressions denote sets
⇓
Consequence:
composition rules need to be adapted
Possibility semantics
Further assumption:
standard type-theoretic composition rules
⇓
Consequence:
typing needs to be adapted
Now let us consider the actual meanings that should be assigned to expressions
in possibility semantics. In alternative semantics, a basic sentence like John walks
is taken to express the singleton set {|W j |}, which has as its unique element the
proposition that John walks.7
(5) John walks = {|W j |} = {{w | j walks in w}}
This treatment may be adopted in possibility semantics as well. Then,
using assumption (3) again, we can work backwards to infer what meanings should be
5 Strictly speaking, an object of type 〈〈s, t〉, t〉 is a function from propositions to truth values. However, it
is common practice to identify such a function with the set of propositions that it maps to 1. We will discuss
this in more detail below.
6 These types are the simplest options for the given items, but as usual, they are not the only available
choice.
7 Throughout the paper we will assume that our logical language contains predicate symbols corresponding
to the verbs and nouns in the fragment of English that we are considering (e.g., W for walks) as well as
individual constants corresponding to the proper names (e.g., j for John). Moreover, for any expression ϕ
of type t in our logical language, we will use |ϕ| in the meta-language to denote the set of worlds where ϕ
holds. For instance, |W j | is the set of worlds where Johnwalks. Finally, we assume that our logical language
contains the standard Boolean connectives that apply to expressions of type t . For instance, |¬W j | denotes
the set of worlds where John does not walk.
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assigned to sub-sentential constituents. If we take proper names like John to denote
individuals, then this procedure immediately suggests the following entry for walks:
(6) walks = λxe.{|Wx |} = λxe.{{w | x walks in w}}
Using the same strategy, i.e., starting from the desired sententialmeanings,we can infer
suitable meanings for other sub-sentential constituents. Below, a small compositional
fragment of English is specified, obeying assumptions 1–3. In particular, in accordance
with assumption 3, the default mode of composition is function application. Items of
type 〈〈e, T 〉, T 〉 may additionally be subjected to standard quantifier raising. This
fragment is not intended to provide a fully satisfactory analysis of the relevant items
and constructions, but just to illustrate the compositional architecture thatwe propose.8
• Proper names and variables:
– Johng = j
– xg = g(x)
• Verbs:
– walk = λxe.{|Wx |}
– see = λxeλye.{|Syx |}
• Connectives:
– orT  = λPT λQT .P ∪ Q
– notT  = λPT .{⋃P}
• Quantifiers and wh-phrases:
– who = λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De Px
– nobody=λP〈e,T 〉.not(⋃x∈De Px)9
• Existential closure:10
– ∃ = λPT .{⋃P}
A comment on our notation is in order at this point. Notice that we use set-theoretic
notation mixed with type-theoretic notation to enhance readability. As is common
practice, we identify a set S ⊆ Dσ with its characteristic function fS ∈ D〈σ,t〉, which
maps any object d ∈ Dσ to 1 just in case d ∈ S. Relying on this identification, we
write, e.g., John walks = {|W j |} instead of John walks = λpst .(p = |W j |);
similarly, we write walk = λxe.{|Wx |} instead of walk = λxe.λpst .(p = |Wx |).
More generally, we identify a set of n-tuples S ⊆ Dσ1 × . . . × Dσn with the
function fS ∈ D〈σ1,...,〈σn ,t〉〉 such that for every tuple 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Dσ1 × . . .× Dσn ,
f (d1) . . . (dn) = 1 just in case 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ S. Types of the form 〈σ1, . . . , 〈σn, t〉〉,
whose objects can be identified with sets of n-tuples, are known as conjoinable types
(Partee and Rooth 1983).
The inclusion relation between sets and the binary operations of union and intersec-
tion can also be encoded in type theory. Given two sets of n-tuples S and S′ encoded
8 Note in particular that itemswith a conjunctive semantics (and, everybody) aremissing from the fragment
specified here. Our reasons for leaving them out here will become clear in Sect. 3, where we will argue that
such items are problematic for both alternative and possibility semantics.
9 Filling in the denotation of not, we get that nobody = λP〈e,T 〉.{{w ∈ Ds | w /∈
⋃
Px for any x ∈
De}}.
10 The ∃-operator corresponds to the existential closure operator in alternative semantics (see, e.g., Kratzer
and Shimoyama 2002). It takes a set of propositions and maps it to a singleton set that contains the union of
these propositions, hence eliminating the structure of the original alternative set. The resulting proposition
is true at a world exactly if one of the original propositions is true at that world. Hence, the ∃-operator has




as elements of D〈σ1,...,〈σn ,t〉〉, and letting x range over tuples in Dσ1 × · · · × Dσn , we
define:
• S ⊆ S′ de f⇐⇒ ∀x : S(x) ≤ S′(x)
• S ∪ S′ := λx .S(x) ∨ S′(x)
• S ∩ S′ := λx .S(x) ∧ S′(x)
We will now use the above fragment to first show how the archetypal alternative-
based accounts of wh-questions and disjunction can be reproduced straightforwardly
in possibility semantics;11 afterwards we will demonstrate that the compositionality
issues discussed above no longer arise in this framework.
2.2.1 Wh-questions
As a first example, consider Hamblin’s (1973) account of wh-questions, for which
alternative semantics was originally developed. Hamblin assumes that who is of type
e, but rather than denoting a single individual, it denotes the whole set of (human)
individuals in the domain. By combining this denotation pointwise with, e.g., the
meaning of sing, {λx .|Sx |}, Hamblin obtains the meaning of who sings:
(7) who sings = {|Sx | | x ∈ De}
The same result may be obtained in possibility semantics without assuming that all
expressions denote sets. However, who cannot be taken to have type e in this setting,
because that would mean that its semantic value is a specific individual. Instead, it has
to be treated as being of type 〈〈e, T 〉, T 〉, just like quantifiers:
(8) who = λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De Px
In words, the function denoted by who takes a function P from individuals to sets
of propositions, and returns the set consisting of all propositions which belong to the
output of P for some input individual x . It is easy to see that applying this function
to the meaning of sing, or to anything of the same semantic type, results precisely in
the meaning that Hamblin obtained by pointwise function application.
(9) who sings = who(sings)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De Px](λx .{|Sx |})
= ⋃x∈De {|Sx |}
= {|Sx | | x ∈ De}
11 Accounts of other linguistic constructions that have been formulated in alternative semantics are repro-
ducible in possibility semantics as well, with one exception: the use of alternatives as a device for
scope-taking (Shimoyama 2006), deriving exceptional scope phenomena as a consequence of pointwise
function application. Since in possibility semantics the mode of composition is standard function applica-
tion, such an account of scope-taking cannot be reproduced. We believe, however, that this is not a serious
loss. In Appendix 1 we argue, building on Charlow (2014), that propagation of alternatives through point-
wise function application does not provide a suitable basis for a general theory of exceptional scope. In
order to obtain such a general theory within our framework, it would be possible to incorporate, e.g., ideas
developed in Jäger (2007), Onea (2015) or Brasoveanu and Farkas (2011), where exceptional scope does
not arise from alternative propagation. This enterprise, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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2.2.2 Disjunction
In recent years, several analyses have been proposed that treat disjunction as an
alternative-generating operation in order to account for, e.g., its semantic contribu-
tion in questions or when embedded under modals (von Stechow 1991; Simons 2005;
Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Aloni 2007). By postulating that α or β = α ∪ β, these
accounts derive two separate alternatives for e.g. John sings or Mary dances, one for
each disjunct, rather than just one disjunctive alternative.
(10) John sings or Mary dances = John sings ∪ Mary dances
= {|Sj |} ∪ {|Dm|}
= {|Sj |, |Dm|}
This may be reproduced categorematically in possibility semantics simply by associ-
ating sentential disjunction with its familiar meaning: orT  = λPT .λQT .P ∪ Q.
Since we dropped the assumption that all expressions denote sets, one may wonder
howdisjunctions of sub-sentential constituents can be handled in possibility semantics.
To see this, consider the sentence John sings or dances. In alternative semantics, for
the disjunctive VP we have:
(11) sing or dance = sing ∪ dance
= {λx .|Sx |} ∪ {λx .|Dx |}
= {λx .|Sx |, λx .|Dx |}
This set of properties then combines with John = { j} by means of pointwise
function application, yielding {|Sj |, |Dj |}. Notice that the disjunctive verb phrase
expresses a set of properties here. Thus, the alternatives that eventually emerge at the
sentential level are already clearly visible at the verb phrase level.
In possibility semantics, the final result is the same, but it is obtained in a different
way.We simply assume that disjunction is given its standard cross-categoricalmeaning
(see, e.g., Partee and Rooth 1983):
(12) For any conjoinable type τ :
orτ  = λXτ .λYτ .X ∪ Y
= λXτ .λYτ .λa. X (a) ∨ Y (a)
The verb phrase is then interpreted as follows.12
(13) sing or dance
= or〈e,T 〉(sing)(dance)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.λQ〈e,T 〉.λxe.λpst .P(x)(p) ∨ Q(x)(p)]
(λxe.λpst .p = |Sx |)(λxe.λpst .p = |Dx |)
= λx .λp.(p = |Sx | ∨ p = |Dx |)
= λx .{|Sx |, |Dx |}
12 When deriving the semantic value of a disjunction α or β, if the values of α and β are construed as
sets, the result can be directly computed by taking the standard union of these sets; it is easy to see that this
coincides with the result given by our type-theoretic definition of union. However, when the values of α




This function combines with John = j by means of standard function application,
yielding the set {|Sj |, |Dj |}. Notice that in this case, the verb phrase does not express
a set of properties, i.e., a set of functions from individuals to propositions, but rather
a single function from individuals to sets of propositions. These sets of propositions
only fully emerge at the sentential level. However, at the VP level they are already
latently present, so to speak: the VP expresses an alternative-generating function, i.e.,
a function that, for any given input, produces a set of alternative propositions. Because
of this shift in perspective, there is no need for pointwise function application.
2.2.3 Standard function application regained
Now let us verify that the compositionality issues that we discussed above for alter-
native semantics no longer arise in possibility semantics. The first of these issues had
to do with pointwise function application, which makes it impossible for an operator
to access the whole set of alternatives generated by its argument at once. Pointwise
function application therefore necessitates a syncategorematic treatment of items like
negation, disjunction, existential closure, and many others that need to operate on the
whole set of alternatives generated by their argument. By contrast, since in possibility
semantics meanings are composed by means of standard function application, there
is nothing that prevents a categorematic treatment of these operators. After all, the
input to the functor is the entire set of alternatives, rather than each alternative in
isolation.
To illustrate this, consider sentential negation, which is now of type 〈T, T 〉. That is,
it expresses a function that takes a set of propositions into a new set of propositions.We
obtain the desired result simply by defining not = λPT .{⋃P}, and letting negation
combine directly with its argument by standard function application. This is illustrated
in the following derivation for John does not sing or dance.
(14) a. John sings or dances = {|Sj |, |Dj |}
b. John does not sing or dance = not({|Sj |, |Dj |})
= [λPT .{⋃P}]({|Sj |, |Dj |})
= {|Sj | ∪ |Dj |}
= {{w ∈ Ds | w /∈ |Sj | and w /∈ |Dj |}}
The result is a singleton set whose unique element is the proposition consisting of all
worlds where John does not sing or dance, as desired.
2.2.4 Standard predicate abstraction regained
Turning to predicate abstraction, in possibility semantics there is no need to devise a
special abstraction rule: the standard rule works fine. To see this in a simple example,
consider the following syntactic tree for who did John see:
123





By function application we get that John saw xg = {|Sjg(x)|}, a set containing a
single proposition. Now, λx is interpreted by means of the standard abstraction rule:
(15) λx John saw xg = λxe.John saw xg[x →x] = λxe.{|Sjx |}
The resulting constituent is of type 〈e, T 〉, i.e., it expresses a function from individuals
to sets of propositions. Applying the above entry for whog to this function yields
the following set of propositions, as desired.
(16) who λx John saw xg = [λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De Px](λxe.{|Sjx |})= ⋃x∈De {|Sjx |}= {|Sjx | | x ∈ De}
Abstraction is unproblematic here, because it needs to deliver a single function from
individuals to sets of propositions, rather than a set of functions from individuals to
propositions.
Although we only gave a very small compositional fragment here, we hope it
suffices to illustrate that theories which have been formulated in alternative semantics
may generally be reproduced straightforwardly in possibility semantics.13 This allows
us to handle the same phenomena in a mathematically more well-behaved setting,
and frees us from the problems described above: first, since function application is no
longer pointwise, operations that need access to the whole set of alternatives generated
by their argument can be given a categorematic treatment; and second, we no longer
need to look for a non-standard alternative-friendly abstraction rule.14
3 Entailment
Type theory does not only comewith the operations of function application and abstrac-
tion which are used to compose meanings; it also comes with a notion of entailment
which is used to compare meanings. This notion amounts to set-theoretic inclusion,
and it applies cross-categorically to expressions of any conjoinable type. This general
notion of entailment also gives rise to a principled cross-categorial treatment of con-
junction and disjunction. Namely, if α and β are expressions of any conjoinable type,
then their conjunction α and β may be taken to denote themeet, i.e., the greatest lower
13 An exception to this claim is mentioned in footnote 11 and discussed in the Appendix.
14 The abstraction issue could also be circumvented by adopting a variable-free semantics. This, as briefly
mentioned above, is the route that Shan (2004) takes. Such a semantics is based on combinatory logic rather
than the lambda calculus, and does not involve abstraction at all. What we show here is that combining




bound, of α and β with respect to entailment. Dually, the disjunction α or β may
be taken to denote the join, i.e., the least upper bound, of α and β with respect to
entailment.15 It is easy to see that, for any two expressions α and β of a conjoinable
type, the meet of α and β with respect to ⊆ always exists, and amounts simply to
the intersection α ∩ β; and similarly, the join of α and β exists and amounts
to the union α ∪ β.
Just like the composition rules of function application and abstraction, the cross-
categorial treatment of entailment, as well as the cross-categorial treatment of
conjunction and disjunction as meet and join operations that it gives rise to, are crucial
features of the standard type-theoretic framework, which should not be lost in the
process of moving to a more fine-grained notion of meaning.
Unfortunately, both in alternative semantics and in possibility semantics, the notion
of entailment as set inclusion no longer gives sensible results. To see this, consider two
basic sentences such as John walks and John moves: intuitively, the first sentence
entails the second. In a classical semantic framework, this is captured by the type-
theoretic notion of entailment: John walks is the set |W j | of worlds where John
walks, and John moves is the set |Mj | of worlds where John moves; since every
world in which John walks is also a world in which John moves, we have |W j | ⊆
|Mj |, and the entailment is predicted. However, in both alternative semantics and
possibility semantics we have John walks = {|W j |} and John moves = {|Mj |};
since {|W j |}  {|Mj |}, the entailment is not predicted.16
The general type-theoretic treatment of conjunction as intersection no longer gives
desirable results in alternative/possibility semantics either. For instance, we would
expect the conjunction John sings and Mary dances to express the singleton {|Sj ∧
Dm|}, which has as its unique alternative the proposition that John sings and Mary
dances. However, treating conjunction as intersection yields an absurd meaning:
(17) John sings and Mary dances = {|Sj |} ∩ {|Dm|} = ∅
Just as for the compositionality problem, there are two ways to react to this prob-
lem: we may try to replace the standard type-theoretic notions of entailment and
conjunction with pointwise counterparts which make suitable predictions in the alter-
native/possibility semantics framework; or, alternatively, we may reconsider some
assumptions of our setup so that the standard type-theoretic notions may be recovered.
We will first consider the first option, i.e., to define pointwise notions of entailment
and conjunction. We will find, however, that such notions are problematic, and then
turn to the second approach.
15 Formally, the meet of a and b with respect to a partial order ≤ is an element c such that (i) c ≤ a, c ≤ b
and (ii) for any d such that d ≤ a and d ≤ b it holds that d ≤ c. Similarly for join. See, e.g., Keenan
and Faltz (1985), Winter (2001), Roelofsen (2013) and Champollion (2016) for more background on these
algebraic notions and their linguistic relevance.
16 This problem was first pointed out by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), who gave it as an argument
against Hamblin’s theory of questions. But as we have just seen, the problem in fact concerns alternative
semantics more generally.
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3.1 Entailment and conjunction in alternative/possibility semantics
3.1.1 Pointwise entailment
Let us consider again the example illustrating the failure of standard entailment in
alternative/possibility semantics: the problem is that the set of alternatives expressed
by John walks is not a subset of the set of alternatives expressed by John moves;
however, notice that the unique alternative for John walks is a subset of the unique
alternative for John moves. This suggests that, instead of comparing the whole set
of alternatives, in alternative/possibility semantics we should really be comparing
the individual alternatives in the sets. More precisely, we may define entailment as
pointwise inclusion: α entails β in case every alternative for α is included in some
alternative for β:
(18) α | β de f⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ α ∃q ∈ β such that p ⊆ q
This notion of entailment would indeed make the right predictions for basic cases: for
instance, since the unique alternative for John walks, |W j |, is included in the unique
alternative for John moves, |Mj |, we would now correctly predict that John walks |
John moves.
However, as discussed in Roelofsen (2013), there is a fundamental problem with
this notion. Namely, entailment defined in this way does not amount to a partial order
on the space of meanings. In particular, it is not anti-symmetric, which means that two
expressions α and β may be logically equivalent—that is, entail each other—and yet
have different meanings. To see this, consider the following two sentences17:
(19) John moves = {|Mj |}
(20) John moves or walks = {|Mj |, |W j |}
Since the proposition |W j | that John walks is contained in the proposition |Mj | that
John moves, every alternative for John moves or walks is contained in an alternative
for John moves. Vice versa, the unique alternative for John moves is clearly contained
in one of the alternatives for John moves or walks. Thus, the two sentences entail
each other, but they have different meanings.18
In a classical intensional framework, if two sentences are logically equivalent,
this implies that they are synonymous, i.e., they have the same meaning. We would
like the notion of logical equivalence in our framework to behave in this classical
17 For concreteness, we assume in our examples that disjunction has the alternative-generating behavior
argued for by Simons (2005), Alonso-Ovalle (2006), and Aloni (2007). Nothing hinges on this assumption,
though, and the reader should feel free to replace disjunction with her favorite alternative-generating item.
18 Notice that in classical, truth-conditional semantics, the two sentences have the same meaning. This fact
has been used to explain the oddness of disjunctions like John moves or walks in terms of redundancy; after
all, in a truth-conditional semantics the second disjunct does not make any contribution to the disjunction
as a whole (Katzir and Singh 2013). If we want to preserve this explanation, the two sentences also have
to be assigned the same meaning in an alternative-based semantics. We will see in Sect. 3.3.2 that this is
indeed achieved in the system we propose.
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way as well. This means that, if a certain equivalence relation doesn’t guarantee that
equivalence implies synonymy, then it is not a suitable notion of logical equivalence
for the framework at hand. Hence, the relation | defined above does not qualify as a
satisfactory notion of entailment in alternative semantics.
This conceptual problem has practical repercussions as well. For instance, if
entailment is not a partial order on the space of meanings, conjunction and dis-
junction can no longer be treated as meet and join operations with respect to
entailment. Consider conjunction: we would like to define α and β as the meet
of α and β, i.e., as the weakest meaning entailing both α and β. How-
ever, since pointwise entailment is not anti-symmetric, there is not a unique such
meaning, but rather a whole cluster of them, and we have no principled way
to single out one particular element from this cluster. This means that we lose
our principled account of conjunction and disjunction in terms of cross-categorial
meet and join operations. Thus, redefining entailment as pointwise inclusion is
unsatisfactory.
3.1.2 Pointwise conjunction
Setting the general problem with entailment aside, we may still try to devise
an alternative-friendly notion of conjunction that avoids the problematic predic-
tions resulting from treating conjunction as intersection. Recall our example: we
have John sings = {|Sj |}, Mary dances={|Dm|}, andwewant John sings and
Mary dances = {|Sj ∧ Dm|} = {|Sj | ∩ |Dm|}. This suggests that, rather than
intersecting two meanings directly, conjunction should be intersecting the individual
alternatives within these meanings. More precisely, it suggests the following treatment
of conjunction as pointwise intersection:
(21) and = λP.λQ.{p ∩ q | p ∈ P and q ∈ Q}
Again, for the most basic cases, this treatment makes the right predictions. For
instance, we do indeed get that John sings and Mary dances = {|Sj | ∩ |Dm|} =
{|Sj ∧ Dm|}; and this extends more generally to all cases where both conjuncts have
singleton meanings. However, with non-singleton conjuncts, pointwise intersection
often yields spurious alternatives. For instance, we expect that conjoining a sentence
with itself will make no difference to its meaning, i.e., we expect conjunction to
be idempotent: for any sentence α, α ∧ α = α. But that is not generally the
case. Consider a sentence with two alternatives, such as α = John sang or danced.
Besides the two expected alternatives |Sj | and |Dj |, the conjunction α ∧ α also
generates a third alternative, namely the proposition |Sj ∧ Dj | that John sang and
danced.
(22) John sang or danced and John sang or danced = {|Sj |, |Dj |, |Sj∧Dj |}
We see no reason why conjunction should give rise to this extra alternative, and we
doubt that empirical support for this prediction may be found. A similar issue also
arises for other items whose meaning relies on set intersection, such as universal
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quantification: if we take a universal quantifier to perform pointwise intersection,
even a vacuous universal quantifier may introduce spurious alternatives.19
3.2 Entailment and conjunction in inquisitive semantics
3.2.1 Recovering standard entailment and conjunction
Given that adapting the notions of entailment and conjunction to alternative/possibility
semantics is not a trivial affair, it is worth considering once more the strategy we
adopted in Sect. 2 to deal with the compositionality problem: identify exactly which
features of the framework are responsible for the problem, and askwhether it is possible
to modify these features so that the problem is avoided, while the desirable features
of the framework are retained.
In order to do this, let us look once more at the example illustrating the problem
with entailment. Why is it that John walks is not a subset of John moves in
alternative/possibility semantics? This is because both meanings are singleton sets,
consisting of the unique alternative for the sentence. The assumption that a basic
sentence α denotes the singleton {|α|}, shared by alternative and possibility semantics,
may seem quite innocent: after all, the standard meaning of a sentence α is a single
proposition, |α|, and if wewant to represent this meaning as a set of propositions, what
better candidate than the singleton set containing just |α|? However, the problems
with entailment and conjunction indicate that identifying classical propositions with
the corresponding singleton sets may not be the best way of embedding classical
semantics into alternative semantics after all.
It is certainly natural to regard a basic sentence like John walks as introducing a
unique alternative, namely, the proposition |W j |. But it does not follow from this that
we have to construe the meaning of John walks as the singleton set {|W j |}. To enjoy
the benefits of having alternatives in our semantics, it is not necessary to assume that
the meaning of a sentence is identical with the set of alternatives that the sentence
introduces; it is sufficient to assume that the meaning of a sentence determines the set
of alternatives that it introduces.
What, then, should we take to be the meaning of a basic sentence like John walks?
Let us examine carefully what the desiderata are. Suppose α and β are two basic
sentences, that is, two sentences having as their unique alternative the proposition that
they classically express. For such sentences, we want the standard, truth-conditional
notion of entailment to be preserved. That is, α | β should hold just in case |α| ⊆ |β|.
Moreover, we want to preserve the standard type-theoretic conception of entailment
19 A reviewer suggests that it may be possible to resolve the problem by defining conjunction in such a
way that it returns only the maximal propositions that result from pointwise intersecting the proposition
sets associated with the two conjuncts. This would indeed give the desired result for the example discussed
here, but it would not solve the more general problem, i.e., it would not make conjunction idempotent.
For instance, if α = John walks or moves, then α = {|W j |, |Mj |}, where |W j | ⊆ |Mj |. Under the
suggested treatment of conjunction we would get that α ∧ α = {|Mj |} = α. Here, too, we see no
reason why α ∧ α should not just be associated with the same alternative set as α itself.
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as meaning inclusion, so α | β should amount to α ⊆ β. To satisfy these two
desiderata, we need to make sure that α and β are construed in such a way that:
(23) |α| ⊆ |β| ⇐⇒ α ⊆ β
This result is naturally obtained if we do not construe α and β as the single-
ton sets {|α|} and {|β|}, respectively, but rather as the powersets ℘(|α|) and ℘(|β|),
i.e., the set of all subsets of |α| and |β|, respectively. Clearly, if |α| ⊆ |β|, then
any subset of |α| is also a subset of |β|. And conversely, if any subset of |α| is
a subset of |β|, then it follows that |α| ⊆ |β|. Intuitively, we take the meaning
of John walks to be the set of all propositions that contain enough information
to establish that John walks, i.e., all propositions p such that John walks in every
world in p, rather than just the proposition that contains precisely the informa-
tion that John walks, i.e., the proposition consisting of all worlds in which John
walks.
This does notmean thatwe give up the idea that John walks has a unique alternative:
for, we can recover the unique alternative for John walks as the maximal element
of its meaning. This is precisely the set of all worlds where John walks. Thus, by
distinguishing the meaning of a sentence from the alternatives it introduces, we can
simultaneously retain the usual alternatives for the sentence on the one hand, and the
standard type-theoretic notion of entailment on the other.
The reasoning just outlined for basic sentences with a single alternative can be
generalized to sentences with multiple alternatives as well. In the spirit of Ham-
blin (1973) as well as inquisitive semantics (see, e.g., Ciardelli et al. 2013, 2015)
such sentences can be thought of as raising an issue as to which of the alternatives
contains the actual world. Crucially, while Hamblin originally identified the mean-
ing of a sentence with the alternatives it introduces, inquisitive semantics dissociates
the two notions in precisely the way discussed above for basic sentences. That is,
the meaning of a sentence in inquisitive semantics consists of all propositions that
contain enough information to resolve the issue that the sentence raises, rather than
just those that contain precisely the information that is needed to do so. As a con-
sequence, sentential meanings in inquisitive semantics are not unconstrained sets of
propositions, as in alternative/possibility semantics, but rather sets of propositions
that are downward closed: if α includes a proposition p then it also includes every
stronger proposition q ⊆ p. After all, if p contains enough information to resolve
the issue that α raises, then any q ⊆ p will also contain enough information to
do so.
We will refer to downward closed sets of propositions as inquisitive meanings and
to the result of making a set of propositions P downward closed as the downward
closure of that set, written as P↓.
(24) P↓ def= {q | q ⊆ p for some p ∈ P}
Given the inquisitivemeaning α of a sentenceα, the alternatives thatα generates can
be identified with the maximal elements of α. Intuitively, these propositions contain
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sufficient information to resolve the issue raised by α, and not more information than
necessary to do so.20
(25) alt(α)
def= {p ∈ α | there is no q ∈ α such that p ⊂ q}
Crucially, while the inquisitive perspective on meaning allows us to associate a set of
alternatives with every sentence, it also allows us to recover the standard type-theoretic
notion of entailment as inclusion. This notion of entailment constitutes a well-behaved
partial order on the space of inquisitive meanings. In particular, it is anti-symmetric,
which means that any two expressions that are logically equivalent express the same
meaning, as desired.
Furthermore, as shown in Roelofsen (2013), the space of inquisitive meanings
ordered by entailment forms a complete Heyting algebra, just like the space of clas-
sical propositions ordered by classical entailment. This means in particular that two
inquisitive meanings P and Q always have:
• a meet, i.e., a unique greatest lower bound w.r.t. entailment, given by P ∩ Q
• a join, i.e., a unique least upper bound w.r.t. entailment, given by P ∪ Q
As a consequence,we can restore the standard treatment of conjunction and disjunction
as meet and join operations. Moreover, these operations still amount to intersection
and union, just as in the classical type-theoretic framework.
(26) and = λP.λQ.P ∩ Q
(27) or = λP.λQ.P ∪ Q
We will see in a moment that these entries for sentential conjunction and disjunction
can be generalized to entries that admit conjuncts/disjuncts of any conjoinable type.
3.2.2 Negation and universal quantification
The fact that inquisitive meanings form a complete Heyting algebra ensures that,
besides the meet and join operations, there are two other general algebraic operations
that can be performed on inquisitive meanings as well, which will allow us to restore
the standard treatment of negation and universal quantification, respectively.
The first of these operations is pseudo-complementation. The pseudo-complement
of an inquisitive meaning P is the weakest inquisitive meaning Q whose meet with P
is inconsistent, i.e., such that P ∩ Q = {∅}. The fact that inquisitive meanings form
a Heyting algebra guarantees that such a pseudo-complement always exists. We will
denote it as ¬ P , and will refer to the operation ¬ as inquisitive negation. There is
a simple recipe to compute ¬ P for any given inquisitive meaning P . Namely, ¬ P
amounts to the set of propositions that are incompatible with every element of P .
(28) ¬ P = {p | p ∩ q = ∅ for all q ∈ P}
20 This approach imposes a constraint on the kinds of alternative sets thatmay be associatedwith a sentence.
Namely, if p and q are two alternatives associated with a sentence α, we must have that p ⊂ q and q ⊂ p,
neither one can be nested in the other. This has interesting repercussions for the analysis of so-calledHurford
disjunctions, like John moves or walks. We will briefly return to this point in footnote 23.
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Just like in classical type-theoretic semantics we may now treat sentential negation
as expressing pseudo-complementation; and again, we will see in a moment that this
treatment can be generalized straightforwardly so as to apply to non-sentential con-
stituents as well.
(29) not = λP.¬ P
An observation that will be useful in dealing with some of the examples to be consid-
ered below is that¬ P always has a uniquemaximal element, i.e., a unique alternative,
namely
⋃P . Thus, ¬ P may be characterized as follows:
(30) ¬ P = {⋃P}↓
Now let us turn to the other algebraic operation, which is called relative pseudo-
complementation. The pseudo-complement of an inquisitive meaning P relative to
another inquisitive meaning Q is the weakest inquisitive meaning R whose meet with
P entails Q, i.e., such that P ∩ R | Q. The fact that inquisitive meanings form
a Heyting algebra again guarantees that such a relative pseudo-complement always
exists. We will denote it as P → Q, and will refer to the operation → as inquisitive
implication. Just as in the case of ¬ P , there is a simple recipe that can be used
to compute P → Q for any two inquisitive meanings P and Q. Namely, P → Q
amounts to the set of propositions p such that for every p′ ⊆ p, if p′ ∈ P then p′ ∈ Q
as well.21
(31) P → Q = {p | for every p′ ⊆ p : if p′ ∈ P then p′ ∈ Q}
Relative pseudo-complementation plays a crucial role in the classical treatment of the
determiner every. In alternative/possibility semantics this treatment is lost, because
the underlying algebraic structure of the classical framework is not maintained. In
inquisitive semantics, on the other hand, it is naturally recovered:
(32) every = λP〈e,T 〉λQ〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈D(Px → Qx)
In a moment, we will see several examples illustrating the consequences of this treat-
ment of every.
3.3 A compositional inquisitive semantics fragment
We now specify a compositional inquisitive semantics for a small fragment of English,
extending the possibility semantics fragment in Sect. 2.2.
21 It may be useful to note that, since the set of all propositions p′ such that p′ ⊆ p and p′ ∈ P can be
denoted compactly as ℘(p) ∩ P , we could also characterize P → Q as follows:
(i) P → Q = {p | ℘(p) ∩ P ⊆ Q}
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• Proper names and variables:
– Johng = j
– xg = g(x)
• Verbs and nouns:
– walk = λxe.{|Wx |}↓
– man = λxe.{|Mx |}↓
– see = λxeλye.{|Syx |}↓• Connectives:
– orτ  = λXτ λYτ .X ∪ Y
– andτ  = λXτ λYτ .X ∩ Y
– notT  = λPT .¬ P
– not〈e,T 〉 = λP〈e,T 〉.λx .¬ Px
• Existential closure:
– ∃ = λPT .{⋃P}↓
• Quantifiers and wh-phrases:
– who = λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De Px
– which = λP〈e,T 〉.λQ〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De (Px ∩ Qx)
– nobody = λP〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De ¬ Px
– no = λP〈e,T 〉.λQ〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De (Px → ¬ Qx)
– everyone = λP〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De Px
– every = λP〈e,T 〉.λQ〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De (Px → Qx)
We will comment on the various elements of this fragment, focusing on differences
w.r.t. alternative/possibility semantics.
3.3.1 Verbs, nouns, proper names, and variables
In inquisitive semantics we want the meaning of a simple sentence like John walks to
be a downward closed set of propositions, namely {|W j |}↓. So we let the verb walk
denote a function that maps any individual x to the set of propositions which contain
enough information to establish that x walks.
(33) walks = λx .{|Wx |}↓
= λx .{p | x walks in every w ∈ p}
A proper name like John just denotes an individual (rather than the singleton set
containing that individual, as in alternative semantics), and the same goes for variables.
If such an individual combines with the denotation of a verb like walk, the resulting
meaning will be a downward closed set of propositions:
(34) walks(John) = [λx .{|Wx |}↓]( j)
= {|W j |}↓
= {p | John walks in every w ∈ p}
3.3.2 Connectives
We already saw above that the inquisitive notion of meaning allows us to restore
the standard treatment of sentential conjunction and disjunction as meet and join
operations. This result generalizes to arbitrary conjoinable types, yielding a cross-
categorical account of conjunction and disjunction. For instance, for the 〈e, T 〉-type
disjunction sing or dance we get:22
22 Recall that we use set-theoretic notation as an abbreviation for type-theoretic notation. Thus, for instance,
our entry for sing, λx .{|Sx |}↓, is to be regarded as an abbreviation for λx .λp.(p ⊆ |Sx |). Also, recall that we
work with the explicit type-theoretic definition of union whenever the arguments are regarded as functions
rather than sets, as in (35).
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(35) sing or dance
= or(sing)(dance)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.λQ〈e,T 〉.λxe.λpst .P(x)(p) ∨ Q(x)(p)](λxe.λpst .p ⊆ |Sx |)
(λxe.λpst .p ⊆ |Dx |)
= λxe.λpst .(p ⊆ |Sx | ∨ p ⊆ |Dx |)
= λxe.{|Sx |, |Dx |}↓
As in alternative semantics, disjunction typically generates alternatives. For instance:
(36) John sings or Mary dances = John sings ∪ Mary dances
= {|Sj |, |Dm|}↓
This meaning has two maximal elements, namely, the proposition that John sings, and
the proposition that Mary dances:
(37) alt(John sings or Mary dances) = {|Sj |, |Dm|}
Thus, we recover the alternative-generating treatment of disjunction that was argued
for on an empirical basis by Simons (2005), Alonso-Ovalle (2006) and Aloni (2007).
However, now this behavior is not stipulated, but follows from the standard treatment of
disjunction as a join operation in the given space of meanings (cf. Roelofsen 2015).23
Next, consider conjunction. Restoring the standard treatment of conjunction as a
meet operator does not only re-establish the link between entailment and conjunction,
but also resolves the empirical problems pointed out above. First, performing inter-
section now yields the right results for cases that were problematic in alternative and
possibility semantics.
(38) John sings and Mary dances = John sings ∩ Mary dances
= {|Sj |}↓ ∩ {|Dm|}↓
= {|Sj | ∩ |Dm|}↓
= {|Sj ∧ Dm|}↓
As desired, John sings and Mary dances is predicted to have a unique alterna-
tive, namely, the proposition that John sings and Mary dances. Moreover, unlike the
pointwise conjunction operation that we considered above, intersection is obviously
idempotent, which means that the problem with spurious alternatives no longer arises:
(39) alt(John sings or dances and John sings or dances) = {|Sj |, |Dj |}
More generally, since conjunction is treated again as performing the meet operation
with respect to entailment, it regains its familiar, well-understood logical features.
23 Note that if one disjunct entails the other, as in John moves or walks, then the resultingmeaning contains
just one alternative, namely |Mj |. This makes it possible to explain the oddness of these so-called Hurford
disjunctions (cf. Hurford 1974; Chierchia et al. 2009; Katzir and Singh 2013) in terms of redundancy. After
all, John moves or walks is synonymous with just John moves; the second disjunct does not make any
contribution to the meaning of the disjunction as a whole. On the other hand, in alternative semantics the
meaning of John moves or walks consists of two alternatives, |Mj | and |W j |, one of which is contained in
the other (as we saw in Sect. 3.1.1). Thus, in alternative semantics John moves or walks is not synonymous
with just John moves, which means that its oddness cannot be explained directly in terms of redundancy
(this point is discussed in more detail in Ciardelli and Roelofsen 2016).
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The problems discussed above for pointwise conjunction do not only concern con-
nectives like and. Rather, all itemswith a conjunctive semantics are affected, including
universal quantifiers like everybody and determiners like which. These items, which
we will consider in more detail momentarily, can now be treated in terms of plain
intersection.24
Let us now turn to negation. We have seen above that the inquisitive notion of
meaning enables us to capture sentential negation as pseudo-complementation, as in
the classical type-theoretic framework. This result can be generalized in order to obtain
a treatment of negation that applies to constituents of type 〈e, T 〉, such as verb phrases.
(40) not〈e,T 〉 = λP〈e,T 〉.λx .¬ Px
For instance, applying this generalized negation to dance of type 〈e, T 〉, we again
obtain an item of type 〈e, T 〉. As desired, not dance denotes a function that maps
an individual to a set of propositions consisting exclusively of worlds in which the
individual doesn’t dance.
(41) not dance = not(dance)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.λx .¬ Px](λx .{|Dx |}↓)
= λx .¬ {|Dx |}↓
= λx .{p | w /∈ |Dx | for all w ∈ p}
= λx .{|¬Dx |}↓
Note that negation, both at sentence and at VP level, has the effect of flattening its
argument set, meaning that the set of propositions arising from a negated constituent
always contains a unique alternative. While this effect doesn’t make a difference in
the example above since dance only generates a single alternative to begin with, it is
crucial in the following derivation, where negation applies to a disjunctive verb phrase.
(42) not sing or dance = not(sing ∪ dance)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.λx .¬ Px](λx .({|Sx |}↓ ∪ {|Dx |}↓))
= λx .¬ ({|Sx |}↓ ∪ {|Dx |}↓)
= λx .{p | w /∈ |Sx | and w /∈ |Dx | for all w ∈ p}
= λx .{|¬Sx ∧ ¬Dx |}↓
As expected, not sing or dance denotes a function that maps every individual x to the
set of propositions consisting only of worlds where x neither sings nor dances. This
set of propositions contains a unique alternative, namely the set of all worlds where x
neither sings nor dances.
3.3.3 Quantifiers
Since the inquisitive notion of meaning enriches the classical one, the denotations of
generalized quantifiers (GQs) in our inquisitive semantics fragment necessarily differ
24 Had we wanted to include entries for these items in the possibility semantics fragment from Section 2,
we would have had to rely on pointwise intersection.
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from those in a classical extensional framework. They do, however, closely mirror
classical GQs. Let us see how exactly.
In an extensional setting, the denotation of a sentence in a world is a truth value.
This is reflected in the semantic objects assigned to GQs. These semantic objects,
which we will also just call GQs, are of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, i.e., sets of properties. A GQ
like every man can thus combine with a verb phrase of type 〈e, t〉, such as sings; the
end result is of type t . One important feature of this setup is that GQs, being sets of
properties, can be compounded by means of algebraic operations like meet and join.
For instance, the GQ expressed by every man and no woman can be obtained by
taking the intersection (meet) of the GQ expressed by every man and that expressed
by no woman.
In inquisitive semantics, the meaning of a sentence is a set of propositions. In the
same way as in the classical setting, this is reflected in the semantic objects assigned
to GQs, which now have type 〈〈e, T 〉, T 〉. A GQ like every man can still combine
with a verb phrase like sings. The difference is that the latter is now of type 〈e, T 〉 and
the end result is of type T .
(43) every man sings = every man(sings)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ → Px)](λx .{|Sx |}↓)
= ⋂x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ → {|Sx |}↓)= ⋂x∈De {p | p ∩ |Mx | ⊆ |Sx |}= {p | ∀x ∈ De : p ∩ |Mx | ⊆ |Sx |}
The resulting set of propositions contains one maximal element, which is the set of
worlds w where the set of men, Mw, is a subset of the set of individuals who sing, Sw.
So the meaning of every man sings amounts to {{w | Mw ⊆ Sw}}↓.
Even though GQs are now more complex, they still have many of the attractive
properties of classical GQs. For instance, just as before, they can be coordinated by
means of generalized disjunction and conjunction. To see how, consider the following
GQs from our inquisitive semantics fragment.
(44) a. every man = λP〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ → Px)
b. no woman = λP〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De ({|Wx |}↓ → ¬ Px)
These lambda terms denote functions that map ‘inquisitive properties’ (functions from
individuals to inquisitive meanings) to sets of propositions. Like any objects of a
conjoinable type, these functions can be regarded as encoding sets of n-tuples, i.e.,
relations, in this case between ‘inquisitive properties’ and propositions.
(45) a. every man = {〈P〈e,T 〉, p〈s,t〉〉 | p ∈ ⋂x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ → Px)}
b. no woman = {〈P〈e,T 〉, p〈s,t〉〉 | p ∈ ⋂x∈De ({|Wx |}↓ → ¬ Px)}
From this set representation, it is clear that we can take, just like in the classical
setting, the intersection and union of these GQs. For instance, we can now obtain the
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GQ expressed by every man and no woman by taking the intersection (meet) of the
above sets:
(46) every man and no woman
= every man ∩ no woman
= {〈P〈e,T 〉, p〈s,t〉〉 | p ∈ ⋂x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ → Px) and p ∈
⋂
x∈De ({|Wx |}↓ → ¬ Px)}
= {〈P〈e,T 〉, p〈s,t〉〉 | p ∈ ⋂x∈De (({|Mx |}↓ → Px)∩({|Wx |}↓ → ¬ Px))}
= λP〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De (({|Mx |}↓ → Px) ∩ ({|Wx |}↓ → ¬ Px))
3.3.4 Wh-phrases
In inquisitive semantics, just as in possibility semantics, wh-phrases likewho or which
song are treated as GQs, as illustrated in the following examples.25
(47) who sings = who(sings)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De Px](λx .{|Sx |}↓)
= ⋃x∈De {|Sx |}↓
= {|Sx | | x ∈ De}↓
(48) which song is playing = which(song)(is playing)
= [λP〈e,T 〉.λQ〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De (Px ∩ Qx)]
(λx .{|Sx |}↓)(λx .{|Px |}↓)
= ⋃x∈De ({|Sx |}↓ ∩ {|Px |}↓)
= ⋃x∈De {|Sx | ∩ |Px |}↓
= {|Sx | ∩ |Px | | x ∈ De}↓
= {|Sx ∧ Px | | x ∈ De}↓
Note that these question meanings are downward-closed: they contain all propositions
that hold enough information to resolve the issue raised by the question. This differs
from the treatment of questions in alternative semantics and possibility semantics.
However, the alternatives in our inquisitive question meanings, i.e., the maximal ele-
ments, still correspond precisely to the standard Hamblin alternatives for who- and
which-questions. For instance:
(49) alt(which song is playing) = {|Sx ∧ Px | | x ∈ De}
25 The treatment of which phrases specified here is close to the one proposed by Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1984). This treatment is known to face a number of problems (for instance, it assigns the same meaning to
which men are bachelors and which bachelors are men), but addressing these is beyond the scope of the




3.3.5 Uniform typing of quantifiers and wh-phrases
In our inquisitive semantics fragment, GQs and wh-phrases share the same seman-
tic type, 〈〈e, T 〉, T 〉. As a consequence, wh-phrases inherit some of the properties
that are traditionally reserved for GQs. As we will see, this uniform typing opens
up novel and interesting ways of analysing certain constructions. At the same time,
however, there are also clear-cut differences between GQs and wh-phrases, which are
classically derived by assigning these items different types. The uniform typing in
inquisitive semantics invites us to reconsider what exactly to regard as the source of
those differences between GQs and wh-phrases.
A first consequence of the uniform typing is that, just like GQs, wh-phrases can
be coordinated by means of generalized conjunction and disjunction. In the following
computation for which starter and which main dish, we use the same strategy as in
the previous example, construing the GQ-denotations as sets of property-proposition
pairs.
(50) which starter and which main dish
= {〈P〈e,T 〉, p〈s,t〉〉 | p ∈
⋃
x∈De ({|Sx |}↓ ∩ Px) and p ∈
⋃
x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ ∩ Px)}
= {〈P〈e,T 〉, p〈s,t〉〉 | p ∈ ⋃x∈De ({|Sx |}↓ ∩ Px) ∩
⋃
x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ ∩ Px)}
= λP〈e,T 〉.⋃x∈De ({|Sx |}↓ ∩ Px) ∩
⋃
x∈De ({|Mx |}↓ ∩ Px)
It is correctly predicted that in order to resolve the issue raised by a question with a
conjoined wh-phrase, such as (51) below, one needs to pick a starter and a main dish,
which amounts to resolving the issue raised by the conjoined question in (52).
(51) Which starter and which main dish would you like?
(52) Which starter would you like, and which main dish would you like?
We straightforwardly derive the same denotations for these two questions, without
having to assume ellipsis in the first.
Similarly, an interrogative with a disjunctive wh-phrase such as (53) receives the
same denotation as the disjunctive question in (54), reflecting the observation that both
questions can be resolved by the same pieces of information: it suffices to pick a tea
or to pick a coffee.26
(53) Which tea or which coffee would you like?
(54) Which tea would you like, or which coffee (would you like)?
Since wh-phrases and GQs have the same type, there is nothing in our semantic frame-
work that prevents them from being coordinated, leading to apparent overgenerations
such as *which man and every woman. This does not mean that a theory formulated
in inquisitive semantics is inherently incapable of ruling such structures out, but rather
that the explanatory burden has to be placed somewhere else than on the type system.
We would like to suggest that this approach may in fact be advantageous, because the
26 For relevant discussion of disjoined wh-questions, see Szabolcsi (1997), Krifka (2001), Haida and Repp
(2013) and Ciardelli et al. (2015).
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coordination of wh-phrases with bona-fide GQs can easily be ruled out on a syntactic
basis, allowing for more fine-grained predictions than those made by a type-based
account.
A widely-held assumption about the syntax of single wh-interrogatives in English
is that the wh-item has to move to a functional head, typically to C, in order to
check its morphological [+wh]-feature (among many others, Chomsky 1977, 1995;
Rizzi 2006). Since wh-movement out of a coordinated phrase is prohibited by island
constraints (Ross 1967), structures like which manx did John see tx and every
woman are ruled out. In contrast, if two wh-phrases are coordinated, the coordinated
phrase as a whole bears a [+wh]-feature and can therefore also move as a whole,
without violating island constraints.
What ismore, the coordination ofwh-phraseswith bona-fideGQs is not as restricted
as it appears at first sight. It becomes acceptable if the wh-item occurs in a quiz-master
question or an echo question such as (55).
(55) John saw WHICH man and every woman?
This fact can be explained in our framework, provided that wh-movement is not oblig-
atory in these kinds of questions in English, while it cannot directly be explained in a
framework that assumes different types for GQs and wh-phrases.27
A second characteristic that wh-phrases share with GQs in our system is their
ability to undergo quantifier raising and to act as binders. Examples like (56) below,
which Shan (2004) pointed out to be problematic for alternative semantics (see the
discussion on page 4), can be given a straightforward analysis, by letting which man
quantifier-raise and trigger lambda abstraction over the verb phrase.28







27 In a classically typed system, it may of course be stipulated that wh-phrases can be type-shifted in order
to allow for coordination in the case of echo questions. But then the fact that coordination is ungrammatical
in regular questions would have to be explained in a different way.




(58) x sold yg = {|Sg( y)g(x)|}↓
λ y x sold yg = λye.{|Syg(x)|}↓
which of hisx paintingsg = λQ〈e,T 〉.⋃y∈De ({|Pg(x)y|}↓ ∩ Qy)
which of hisx paintings λ y x sold yg = ⋃y∈De ({|Pg(x)y|}↓ ∩ {|Syg(x)|}↓)
λx which of hisx paintings λ y x sold yg = λxe.⋃y∈De ({|Pxy|}↓∩{|Syx |}↓)
which mang = λQ〈e,T 〉.⋃z∈De ({|Mz|}↓ ∩ Qz)
which man λx which of hisx paintings λ y x sold yg
= ⋃z∈De ({|Mz|}↓ ∩
⋃
y∈De ({|Pzy|}↓ ∩ {|Syz|}↓))
= ⋃z∈De ({|Mz|}↓ ∩ {|Pzy| ∩ |Syz| | y ∈ De}↓)
= ⋃z∈De ({|Mz| ∩ |Pzy| ∩ |Syz| | y ∈ De}↓)
= {|Mz ∧ Pzy ∧ Syz| | y, z ∈ De}↓
The third and final possibility that arises from the uniform typing of GQs and wh-
phrases is a novel way of deriving pair-list readings for questions like (59).
(59) What did everyone bring for the potluck?
This question has a salient interpretation, called the pair-list reading, on which it
is understood as inquiring, for every person, what she brought for the potluck (see,
e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984; Higginbotham 1991; Chierchia 1993; Szabolcsi
1997). In our framework, this reading can be derived simply by letting the universal
outscope the wh-phrase. In a classically typed system, this would be compositionally
impossible, whereas here it is unproblematic since interrogatives have the same type as
declaratives and, again, wh-phrases have the same type as GQs. The pair-list reading is
hence construed as universal quantification ranging over individuals and having scope
over a question, or, in other words, as a large conjunction of questions, one for each
individual: what did a bring, and what did b bring, and what did c bring, …? In order
to resolve the issue raised by the pair-list question, one has to resolve all issues that
are raised by the conjoined questions. To see what this amounts to formally, consider
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(61) x bring yg = {|Bg( y)g(x)|}↓
λy x bring yg = λye.{|Byg(x)|}↓
whatg = λQ〈e,T 〉.⋃y∈De Qy
what λ y x bring yg = ⋃y∈De {|Byg(x)|}↓
λx what λ y x bring yg = λxe.⋃y∈De {|Byx |}↓
everyoneg = λQ〈e,T 〉.⋂x∈De Qx




= ⋂x∈De {|Byx | | y ∈ De}↓= {p | for every x ∈ De, p ⊆ |Byx | for some y ∈ De}
Hence, we can observe again that uniform typing removes constraints that, in a clas-
sically typed system, would arise as an immediate consequence of the type difference
between GQs and wh-phrases. As we have already seen in the case of conjoined GQs
and wh-phrases, however, there are two sides to this new-gained flexibility, with the
danger of overgeneration never too far away. In the case of pair-list readings, on the
one hand, we gain the ability to derive these readings in a very natural and transparent
fashion, but on the other hand, we now have to find an explanation for those cases in
which pair-list readings are blocked. To begin with, not all GQs allow such readings.
While everybody lends itself naturally to a pair-list interpretation, for, e.g., most this
reading seems to be blocked in matrix questions such as (62), though available if the
question is embedded under an extensional verb, as in (63) (Szabolcsi 1997).
(62) What did most people bring for the potluck?
(63) John knows what most people brought for the potluck.
Furthermore, there is an asymmetry between GQs occuring in subject position and in
object position: the former readily allow pair-list readings, while for the latter these
readings are much harder to come by (May 1985; Achimova et al. 2010). A detailed
account of these phenomena lies beyond the scope of the current paper.29 The discus-
sion here is merely meant to highlight the possibilities that arise from uniform typing.
Summing up this section then, we have seen that the issues with entailment and
coordination that arise in alternative semantics may be avoided by reconsidering one
of the basic features of the framework, namely, the identification of the meaning of
a sentence with the set of alternatives that it generates. By teasing the two notions
apart, construing the meaning of a sentence as a downward closed set of propositions,
and viewing the maximal elements of this set as the alternatives that the sentence
generates, we obtain a semantic framework which allows us to retain on the one hand
an alternative-inducing notion of meaning, and on the other hand, the classical type-
theoretic account of generalized entailment and coordination.30
29 Interestingly, the fact that quantifiers like most cannot directly scope over questions, unlike quantifiers
like every, may be connected to the fact that, in the verbal domain, verbs like believe cannot apply to
questions, unlike verbs like know. While these empirical contrasts have so far only been considered in
isolation, inquisitive semantics may make it possible to give a unified explanation.
30 A brief note on how focus may be treated in our framework, to avoid possible confusion. We are




While it clearly seems that alternatives have an important role to play in seman-
tics, the specific architecture of Hamblin-style alternative semantics forces us to give
up two crucial features of classical compositional semantics, namely, (i) the type-
theoretic composition operations of function application and abstraction and (ii) the
type-theoretic treatment of cross-categorical entailment and coordination. This leads
to a number of problems, both empirical and theoretical.
We have tried to identify precisely which features of alternative semantics are
responsible for these issues, and how they could be modified in order to avoid the
resulting problems. First, we argued that the compositionality issue stems from the
assumption that all expressions denote sets of objects of the corresponding type.
This assumption does not seem to have strong conceptual or empirical motivation,
and dropping it does not seem to undermine the empirical coverage of the theories
that are formulated in alternative semantics. This step led us to the framework of
possibility semantics, where sentences still denote sets of propositions, but meanings
are composed by means of the standard type-theoretic operations.
However, like alternative semantics, possibility semantics still faces the entailment
issue, which also leads to problems in the treatment of conjunction. We argued that
this issue stems from the assumption that the meaning of a sentence is identical with
the set of alternatives that it generates. Once again, this assumption does not seem
strictly necessary, neither from a conceptual point of view nor from an empirical one.
Conceptually, there is another natural perspective on sentential meanings, motivated
in recent work on inquisitive semantics, under which they are construed as sets of
propositions that are downward closed. Empirically, all that is required for concrete
linguistic applications of the framework is that the meaning of a sentence determine
a set of alternatives. If the meaning of a sentence is a downward closed set of propo-
sitions, the maximal elements of this set are naturally viewed as the alternatives that
the sentence generates. This conception of sentence meanings resolves the entailment
issue: the general type-theoretic notion of entailment is recovered, and conjunction
and disjunction can again be treated as meet and join operations w.r.t. entailment.
The resulting framework retains a fine-grained notion of meaning, which associates
every sentencewith a set of alternatives, but has amuchmore solid type-theoretic foun-
dation than Hamblin-style alternative semantics: meanings are composed by means
of the standard type-theoretic composition rules, compared by means of the standard
notion of entailment as meaning inclusion, and coordinated by means of standard
Footnote 30 continued
ordinary sentential meanings. Rather, the most natural way to deal with focus in our framework would
be to let the focus semantic value of an expression be, as usual, a set of objects of the same type as the
ordinary semantic value of that expression. For instance, the focus semantic value of a proper name is a set
of individuals, and the focus semantic value of a complete sentence is a set of inquisitive meanings, i.e.,
a set of downward closed sets of propositions. This is just the standard treatment of focus (Rooth 1985),
only the types of objects that certain expressions receive as their ordinary semantic value have changed,
and therefore the types of objects that they are assigned as their focus semantic value change accordingly.
In principle, focus semantic values may be composed in a pointwise fashion, as in Rooth (1985). As far as
we can see, the problems that we pointed out in Sect. 2 do not directly apply at the level of focus semantic
values.
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generalized conjunction and disjunction. In this way, the empirical coverage of the
analyses formulated in alternative semantics is preserved, while the observed frame-
work issues are avoided.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Appendix 1: Pointwise propagation of alternatives as a device for scope-
taking
A well-known problem in semantics is the observation that indefinite phrases have
the ability to take exceptional wide scope (Farkas 1981; Fodor and Sag 1982). For
instance, under a salient reading of (64), some relative of mine takes scope over the
conditional (Reinhart 1997). This reading cannot be obtained if scope is determined
purely by the LF configuration, since island constraints prevent the indefinite phrase
from moving out of the antecedent.
(64) If some relative of mine dies, I will inherit a house.
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), drawing inspiration from indeterminate pronouns in
Japanese, demonstrate how exceptional scope can be derived as a consequence of
composing alternatives via pointwise application: the alternative-generating phrase is
interpreted in-situ, and the alternatives it introduces percolate upwards in the tree until
they encounter an operator that “binds” them, such as existential closure or negation.
It is clear that this alternative percolation is insensitive to island boundaries, and can
therefore capture the exceptional scoping behaviour we observe with indefinites.
In contrast, in the framework proposed here pointwise propagation of alternatives
cannot be used as a device for scope-taking. Since the mode of composition is clas-
sical function application, alternatives do not freely percolate upwards. The system
could of course be extended to include an account of exceptional scope, and various
options seem compatible with our approach (e.g., Jäger 2007; Brasoveanu and Farkas
2011; Onea 2015)—but exceptional scope cannot arise as a consequence of pointwise
propagation of alternatives.
We believe, however, that this limitation does not present an argument against our
framework, because we think that letting alternatives do double-duty as a device for
scope-taking and modeling e.g. the semantics of questions is in fact problematic.
One problem for the double-duty strategy comes from the realm of embedded inter-
rogatives. Since Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977), it has been one of the standard
approaches in question semantics to represent the meaning of interrogatives, both in
root and in embedded contexts, as sets of alternatives. If alternatives are additionally
used for scope-taking though, then it seems that these different functions can easily get
confounded. For an example of this happening, consider the following sentence, where
the if-clause contains an embedded interrogative which in turn contains an indefinite
inside a scope island.
(65) If John finds out which movies by a famous director are playing at the festival,
he’ll let us know.
It is not possible to derive the exceptional wide scope reading for the indefinite using
pointwise propagation of alternatives as a scoping device, for the following reason.
There are two alternative-generating expressions in the antecedent, the wh-phrase and
the indefinite phrase. The indefinite phrase cannot leave its base position in the island,
meaning that the alternatives from both sources have to be generated and composed
within the scope of the question-embedding verb find out. Furthermore, they are
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composed by pointwise application, resulting in a flat set of alternatives that holds no
information about the source of the alternatives:
{playing(x) | movie-by(y, x), director(y)}
This set is passed on in the derivation and subsequent operators have no way
of distinguishing between the “alternativehood” introduced by the wh-phrase and
that introduced by the indefinite. Such operators could be quantifiers (this has been
brought to attention by Charlow (2014) and we will discuss it below) or, as here,
elements responsible for the semantics of question-embedding. Extensional question-
embedding predicates like find out are usually taken to express a relation between the
subject and some answer to the embedded question. Hence, in the derivation of (65),
an answer needs to be computed from the alternative set denoted by the question.31
That means that the question denotation, an alternative set, is turned into a proposition
and only this proposition can be passed on to the further derivation steps. For the
indefinite, this means that its scope is trapped inside the complement clause.
The reason that classical alternative semantics is unable to deal with sentences
like (65) seems to be that the alternative sets it operates with are lacking structure.
Charlow (2014) proposes a modified alternative semantics that makes it possible to
treat the propagation of alternatives in a much more controlled fashion. In particular,
alternative sets can be nested, permitting him to distinguish between different sources
of alternatives and, thereby, to handle selective scope configurations. It is conceivable
that, in Charlow’s system, the answer operator would only apply to the inner layer
of alternatives whereas the outer layer would be passed on in the computation, hence
allowing for an account of cases like (65).
We take the picture so far to indicate that either (i) scope-taking and question
semantics should not both be treated using alternatives, or (ii), if both scope-taking
and question semantics are treated using alternatives, then these alternatives have to
come with a richer structure and an overall compositional architecture that is more
differentiated than unrestrained pointwise application.
Now, if scope-taking and question semantics should not both be dealt with in terms
of the same mechanism, either of them stands in need of a different treatment. In
our framework, alternatives are used to model the meaning of questions, but one may
wonder whether the other choice is also viable: if question semantics were to be
captured in a different way, would pointwise propagation of alternatives be a suitable
tool for scope-taking? We believe that the answer is negative.
Let us first consider an argument by Charlow (2014) to the effect that classical
alternative semantics is not capable of accounting for selective binding, e.g., for con-
figurations in which multiple indefinites appear together in the same environment and
only one of them takes exceptional wide scope. In particular, Charlow holds that in
classical alternative semantics we cannot derive the reading of (66-a) in which a rich
relative of mine takes exceptional scope without a favorable will doing so as well,
and similarly for (66-b).
31 Whether it is the embedding predicate itself that computes this answer or some designated answer
operator is immaterial in this context.
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(66) a. If a rich relative of mine draws up a favorable will, I’ll inherit a house.
b. If a lawyer visits a rich relative of mine, I’ll inherit a house.
The reason behind this limitation is the same as what we observed for example (65):
alternative sets lack the structure to distinguish between alternatives from different
sources. Therefore, an alternative-evaluating operator cannot single out a certain sub-
set of alternatives; either all alternatives get bound, or none. However, while these
examples illustrate the inability of alternative semantics to bind selectively, they don’t
seem sufficient to show that this framework fails as a general theory of scope-taking.
This is because, in principle, configurations like those needed for (66) can be obtained
in a nonselective framework if we relax the distribution of the existential closure oper-
ator. Standardly, this operator only applies to sentential constituents, hence necessarily
binding all alternatives generated within the respective sentence. In contrast, if it could
apply locally to a will or a lawyer, as sketched in (67), then the alternatives intro-
duced by these phrases would be bound at a suitably low position. A second existential
closure applying at sentence level would in turn bind the alternatives introduced by
a relative of mine.32 Hence, at first sight it appears that, if we let existential clo-









∃ a lawyer a relative
then...
However, there are also scope configurations that evade this strategy. In (68) for
example, one of the indefinites takes exceptional wide scope while the other one—
and this is different from (67)—takes intermediate scope. Here, a professor cannot
be bound by a locally applying existential closure operator since this would give it
scope below every book. Placing the existential closure higher in the structure, such
as above every book, is not an option either since this would bind the alternatives
from both indefinite phrases.
(68) Background: There is a course on medieval history at University X, which
is not always taught by the same professor. All professors who have taught
the course, though, managed to make most of their students very enthusiastic
about the topic. So much so that, every year, most students who took the course
read every book that their professor recommended.
32 Of course, the distribution of the existential closure operator would also need to be appropriately
restricted, and this is not a trivial problem.
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Most students read every book that a professor recommended for a course on
medieval history at University X.
Intended reading: a course > most students > a professor > every book
This example shows that pointwise propagation of alternatives as implemented in
classical alternative semantics cannot deal with selective binding and is therefore not a
suitable basis for a general theory of scope-taking. In contrast, certain non-alternative-
based theories of exceptional scope such as Brasoveanu and Farkas (2011) or Onea
(2015) can capture the configuration in (68).
Charlow’s enriched alternative semantics is able to deal with this example too,
owing to two key characteristics of his system. First, as already mentioned, alternative
sets can be nested, allowing for selective quantification. Second, the default mode
of composition is standard function application; pointwise application only enters the
picture through the semantics of certain type-shifting operators that, in effect, simulate
pointwise application. This way, Charlow can employ pointwise application in a more
controlled way, which gives him a handle on where in the derivation alternatives
percolate and where they don’t. Thus, although in Charlow’s system scope arises
partly through alternative percolation, his framework is fundamentally different from
classical alternative semantics.
We have seen, then, that classical alternative semantics is unfit as a general theory
of scope: trouble can arise when alternatives are simultaneously used for scope-taking
and for question semantics, but also when they serve no such double function. We
conclude that any theory which employs alternatives for scope-taking—regardless for
what else it uses alternatives—needs a richer structure for these alternatives and a way
to curb their unrestrained propagation.
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